This paper puts forth an explanation of the recent escal ation of violent crime in 
I. Introduction
Talking about "crime epidemics" has become fashionable a mong journalists, politicians and researchers alike. As trite as this ex pression might seem, it contains some truth: crime rates -as is certainly the case with epide mics-change dramatically and without apparent reason as we move from one place to an other and from one year to the next (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996) . Crime, to put it another way, seems to dance to its own music. Most economic explanations of this phenomenon rely on various types of positive externalities among criminals. Gener ally speaking, these externalities can be global or local, where the former refers to the e ffect of aggregate crime levels on individual behavior, and the latter to the effect of in dividual agents on each other's behavior. In this paper I study both local and global ext ernalities among criminals in an attempt to understand both the rise of violent crime an d the emergence of dramatic regional differences of criminal prevalence that took pl ace Colombia during the 1980s.
The Colombian experience over the past two decades cons titutes a compelling case study in the evolution of violent crime. The magni tude of violent crime in Colombia is staggering. The homicide rate in the country is three ti mes that of particularly violent countries as Brazil and Mexico, seven times that of t he United States and 50 times that of a typical European country (see Appendix 1). In some citie s, the violent crime figures reached epidemic proportions. Medellin, Colombia's secon d largest city, experienced over 400 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in the early 1990s (see Appendix 2) . These figures are even more striking when we recognize that Colombia has had a stable democratic government for over 40 years and the country is free of any form of racial and religious fragmentation.
The upward progression of the homicide rate in Colombia w as severe. The violence started its ascending trend in the late 1970s and b y the early 1990s had more than
tripled. Yet murder was not the only criminal activity that skyrocketed during the 1980s.
Kidnappings, car thefts, bank robberies and even petty crim es also increased dramatically in the same period of time. Further, the acceleration of violent crime in Colombia was accompanied by a sharp spatial polarization-whereas crime increased by a factor of ten in some regions, it barely changed in others.
Clearly, if we are to come to grips with what happened i n Colombia, we must address both the rapid increase in violent crime and the emergence of huge regional disparities in crime prevalence. This poses a special ch allenge because it requires a model that includes both temporal and spatial dimensions. Most models in the literature focus only on one of these dimensions. Glaeser et al. (1996) , for example, argue forcefully that we can make sense of the high variance of crime acros s cities in the United States with a simple model of local interactions that abstracts com pletely from the temporal dimension.
These authors assume, in particular, that the extent of interactions among criminals do not differ across cities, and that all cities are close t o steady state all the time. These assumptions, however, are inappropriate for the case of Colombia because of the obvious regional differences in criminal interactions and the non-stationary nature of the data (see Figure 1 ).
In this paper I consider three implicit models that isol ate different types of externalities among criminals. In the first model -bas ed on a global externality-criminals make crime more appealing to nearby residents by congesti ng the law enforcement system and hence lowering the probability of punishment (Sah, 1991) . In the second modelbased on a local externality-the interaction of care er criminals and local crooks speeds up the diffusion of criminal know-how and criminal technol ogy. In the third model -based on a different local externality-the daily contact of yo uth with criminal adults and criminal peers results in the erosion of morals and hence in a greater predisposition toward crime.
Each of these models can account for the crime escala tion that took place in Colombia. In the congestion-in-law-enforcement model there are multiple equilibria and crime escalations can be rationalized as a movement from a low-crime to a high-crime crime equilibrium. The other two models postulate differen t types of dynamic externalities (knowledge spillovers and neighborhood effects) that can a lso account for criminal escalations in a way analogous to the effects of human capital spillovers in "new-growth" theory models. Moreover, to the extent that the postul ated externalities are geographically circumscribed, each of these models can also account fo r the regional differences in criminal rates that followed the wave of violent cri me in Colombia. by the increasing violence can be explained by the for mation of clusters. In sum, the multiple equilibria model can, at least partially, account for the evolution of both the economy-wide homicide rates and the distribution of hom icide rates across states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the magnitude of the crime problem in Colombia, Section III present s the theoretical background along with some general evidence, Section IV presents an empi rical test of the multiple equilibria model (the main hypothesis of the paper), and finally Se ction V draws some general conclusions.
II. The Facts

A. International Comparison
International comparisons of crime rates are difficult . Not only do crime definitions vary greatly among countries, but also cross-country data is sparse. To make matters worse, the accuracy of the data varies substantially f rom country to country, which makes us wonder whether some of the data differences may be due to dissimilarities in the recording and reporting systems rather than to true differ ences in criminal activity. Not everyday does one come across such a huge outlier whe n comparing international indicators. Plainly, the level of violent crime in C olombia defies any attempt at an explanation based upon socioeconomic characteristics.
B. Time series evidence
The progression of the homicide rate in Colombia is sh own in Figure 1 . Some "contextualization" of the previous evidence seem s necessary at this point.
Colombia is often considered the hub of international drug trafficking. In an often quoted The male rate is arguably a better measure of the lev el of criminal activity than the corresponding rate for the whole population. The reason is simple: a signif icant proportion of all murders involving women can be attributed to "crimes of passion", which, in tur n, are somewhat independent of the prevalent level of criminal activity and, therefore, quite stable acro ss nations. (This conjecture is indirectly confirmed b y the much smaller variance of the female homicide rate in the countries of the sample).
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The dashed line in Figure 1 corresponds to a linear trend with a break in 1979. A formal analysis using the methodology proposed by Perron (1989) indicates the presen ce of a structural break in the Colombian homicide rate in either 1978, or 1979, or 1980 . This methodology f its a broken trend to the data and then examines if the de-trended series has a unit root. If no t, the breaking points can be regarded as structural changes (see also Inwood and Stengos, 1981 host of a thriving rebel activity for more than four decades. Current estimates set the number of active rebels well-above ten thousand people ( Gaitan, 1995, pp. 365 ).
However, the violence in Colombia cannot be consider ed as a simple reflection of the criminal activities of drug smugglers and guerrillas. Ac cording to all available estimates, the proportion of homicides directly attribut able to drug traffickers is less than 10 percent (Gaitan, 1995, pp. 386) . Amnesty International put it bluntly in a recent publication, "the perception of drug-trafficking as the princ ipal cause of violence in
Colombia is a myth" (AI, Annual Report, 1994, pp. 9) . Likewis e, it has been estimated that more than 95% of the all homicides are unrelated to the state-guerrilla confrontation (Vargas, 1993 , pp. 154, Gaitan, 1995 , pp. 361, and Montenegro and Posada, 1994 . In sum, over 80 percent of all homicides in Colombia are th e manifestation of an amorphous violence not directly related to major criminal organi zations.
III. A Collage of Possible Explanations
The use of modern economic analysis to study criminal b ehavior has a long tradition. In a seminal paper published 30 years ago, Gary S . Becker (1968) advanced the idea that criminals are rational, self-interested agen ts whose behavior can be best understood as an optimal response to incentives. This vi ew, often referred to as the deterrence hypothesis, has become almost commonplace i n the economics literature.
Roughly speaking, Becker's model predicts that criminals wil l expand their activities if either the certainty or the size of punishment decreas es.
The deterrence hypothesis has been extended to incorpora te equilibrium considerations in the so-called market-for-offenses mo del (Ehrlich, 1996) . In this model, the level of crime is jointly determined by the supply o f offenses (reflecting people's decision to participate in illegal activities), and the demand for private and public protection from crime (which implicitly defines the dem and for offenses).
Becker and Ehrlich's models are deeply rooted in the neoc lassical tradition, and thereby they rely on the assumptions of optimizing beha vior, rational expectations and stable preferences. Also, these models emphasize what we may call "negative feedbacks."
That is, they emphasize mainly how private and public ex penditures on crime control work to offset any change in criminal behavior. Thus, in t hese models, an exogenous crime shock will trigger a wave of anti-crime expenditures by b oth private and public agents, which in turn will lower the magnitude of the initial s hock. High levels of crime are then short-lived in the Beckerian tradition.
Thus, the market-for-offenses model, at least in its s tandard form, does not appear to be the appropriate framework to study the causes of the Colombian criminal explosion.
A more promising approach would be to focus on models stres sing positive externalities among criminals and hence the possibilities of endogenous crime escalations. Below, I set forth three different implicit models emphasizing positiv e feedbacks in crime rates stemming from interactions among criminals. Also, I pr esent empirical evidence concerning the ability of these models to shed some li ght on the dynamics of Colombian violence. The models are meant to be complements rath er than substitutes, and together they provide a good understanding of the mechanisms underlyin g the emergence of
Colombia as perhaps the most violent country in the wo rld.
A clarification is in order at this point. The models presented below are models of crime and hence they do not deal explicitly with violen ce. More precisely, there is not a clear distinction between crime and violence throughout the paper. This is not as big a shortcoming as it might first seem, since most of the violence in Colombia can be understood as a by-product of criminal activities. In sho rt, the puzzles of violence and crime are intertwined.
A. Crime and Congestion in Law Enforcement
In this section two additional assumptions are added to th e static Becker's framework so as to make it more amenable to dynamic co nsiderations. Here, I closely follow previous theoretical work that has examined the implications of adding dynamic assumptions to static incentive problems in general and criminal models in particular. (see, for example, Andvig and Moene 1990 , Sah 1991 , Schrag and Scotchme r 1993 , and Freeman et al. 1996 . In particular, I will expand Becker's model to include the following two components.
First, the actual probability of being punished is negatively related to the current criminal rate. That is, the higher the incidence of c rime, the more difficult it is to punish a criminal, holding police resources constant. Interestin gly, this assumption suggests the presence of positive feedbacks in criminal activities. The idea is simple: by reducing the amount of police resources spent per criminal, an exogeno us increase in crime will lower the actual probability of being punished, and hence will t end to further increase crime.
3 Second, criminal rates exhibit inertia in that they cannot deviate significantly from past values. Several sources of inertia have been empha sized in the literature. Sah (1991) , for example, argues that people estimate the actual (and unknown) probability of being punished by "sampling" their neighbors -they incorporate bo th past and present information in their inferences. Obviously, insofar as people's inferences are rooted in the past, criminal rates will exhibit inertia. Accordingly , a drop in the actual probability of being punished -caused by, say, a cut in enforcement expendit ures-will have only a limited effect on people's inferences, and hence will b arely modify the current criminal rate in the short run. Similarly, Freeman et al. (1996) argue t hat high criminal rates today may cause some youths to defer human capital investments-they may drop out of high school lured by the prospects of high returns of criminal activi ties. This will in turn cause inertia since undereducated youth will have limited access to legal opportunities and hence will be more prone to commit crimes in the future.
It is worth noting that these two assumptions work in o pposite directions: whereas the former postulates a mechanism whereby criminal sh ocks feed on themselves, the latter implies that criminal shocks wither as time goes by. T his tension gives rise to rich
dynamics. An apposite example based on Sah (1991) is depicted i n Figure What does this stylized story have to say concerning t he Colombian violent escalation? I argue below that the available empirical evidence is compatible with the implicit model sketched above. But before reviewing the e vidence, we must provide an important missing element in our story. In short, we must identify the criminal shock that, supposedly, triggered the self-reinforcing criminal escalat ion. From the theoretical discussion, we just know that the shock must have been la rge enough to drive the system from one basin of attraction to another, and long eno ugh to offset the excess of inertia that presumably characterizes criminal rates.
I shall argue that an important coincidence provides the missing information: the acceleration of violent crime in Colombia coincided w ith the consolidation of the country as the main supplier of cocaine in international market s. I hypothesize then that the criminal activity brought about by the struggle for the c ontrol of the profitable cocaine exporting business was the initial thrust that set in m otion the spiraling of crime in Colombia (more on this later on).
Once we have identified the detonator, the story is co mplete. During the late 1970s, some Colombian regions experienced an outburst of vio lent crime associated with 4 The main assumptions behind the example are: (1) each per son stays active for 5 periods, (2) each person observes 5 individuals (criminals and no criminals ) every period, (3) the initial beliefs regarding the actual probability of punishment are distributed Beta (1, 3), (4) the updating of beliefs uses Bayes rule, the consolidation of the cocaine business. The cartel s 5 were establishing a reputation for violence while killing off their enemies outside and ins ide the government. This criminal wave overwhelmed a fragile justice system. Sooner than later local would-be criminals realized that both police and prosecutors were not keeping up with the increasing level of crime. This prompted many of them to enter a life in c rime. As a result, kidnappings, carjackings and bank robberies skyrocketed (see Figure 2 ). Ev entually, the level of crime associated with drug trafficking subsided (the winners had be en decided), but the crime level had already reached a critical mass-it was by the n self-sustaining. Indeed, the probability of being punished (sent to prison) reached such low levels (3 % for homicides and 1% for robberies, see Gaitan 1995, pp. 330) that would-be cr iminals were very certain that, literally, they could get away with murder.
As noted earlier, the available evidence lends consider able support to the previous story. First, kidnappings, carjackings and bank robberies la gged the rise in homicides, which makes perfect sense in the light of the hypothesi zed gradual congestion of the Colombian law enforcement system. Second, the sparse available information on arrests and indictments shows that the Colombian justice syste m became so overwhelmed by the rising levels of crime that unsolved cases began mountin g at an exponential rate. Figure 4 shows the striking decline of the probability of being c harged with homicide (computed here as indictments over homicides) over the last deca de (see Appendix II for the sources of information). The underlying data shows that whereas homicides almost tripled in this period, the number of indictments stayed almost constant at around 5,000 per year.
Moreover, Figure 4 surely underestimates the breakdown of t he Colombian law enforcement system for at least two reasons: first, many inductees are never brought to justice in Colombia, and second, even when they are, t hey often bribe their way out of prison.
and (5) the actual probability of punishment (r) is compute d as r = Max(1-C², 0.1) , where C is the economy wide crime participation rate.
5
The term cartel should not be taken literally. As poin ted by The Economists (December 24, 1994), "there is little evidence that certain traffickers ever trie d to restrict supply, and none that they succeeded." 6 A striking example of the importance of criminal externa lities is the city of Medellin. In 1992, this city led the country in the following criminal categories: h omicides (about 8,000), car thefts (about 4,000), bank robberies (123), and kidnappings (Gaitan, 1985, pp.386) . Undoubtedly , this suggests the presence of important across-crime spillovers. Yet another caveat might be necessary. There seems t o be a discord between the theoretical discussion and the empirical evidence in tha t whereas the former predicts a change in criminal levels (a movement between steady states), the latter shows an increase in growth rates (see Figure 1 ). for the by-then growing cocaine market (Stares, 1996) . Acc ording to Shannon (1988, pp.75) , "the Colombian gangsters were organized, hard-working, and highly competitive.
Worldlier than most provincial crooks, they used their a ccess to good air connections, communications, and international banks to great advanta ge."
C. Learning and Technological Spillovers in the Criminal Industry
As is obvious from the increase of kidnappings, bank robbe ries and car thefts, local In short, knowledge and technological spillovers among ne arby "firms" may be an important source of positive feedbacks in the crim inal industry.
Drug traffickers (and to a lesser extent guerrilla groups) w ere an additional source of learning and technological spillovers in the case of Colombia. As far as knowledge 8 Different estimates of net proceeds from drug trafficking range from one to three billion dollars annually (Kalmanovitz 1992, and Gomez 1988 whereas murders using other means grew "just" by 100 percent in the same period (Salazar and Jaramillo, 1992b, pp. 82 ).
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The type of dynamic externalities described above are a ppealing because they not only can explain the acceleration in crime rates in the country as a whole, but also can make sense of the differential growth rates of crime i n different regions (Glaeser et al., 1992) . The empirical side of this story, however, remains problematic. As Paul Krugman (1991, pp. 53) puts it, "knowledge flows are invisible; they lea ve no paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked." This is even more so for the criminal industry given the obvious informational limitations. The partnership between guerrillas and drug traffickers is w ell-known in Colombia. In its most common form, rebels provide protection for cocaine labs while charging a "sale tax" in exchange (Gaitan, 1995) .
The diffusion of guns from drug markets also seems to have played a crucial role in the explosion of youth violence that took place in the United States in the late 1980s (Blumstein, 1995 
D. Change of Values
The neoclassical models of crime portray individuals as rational beings willing to break the rules whenever a favorable opportunity arises. This simplification, although convenient in certain settings, cannot be taken too f ar. As has been pointed out many times, no society would survive if its citizens violat ed its rules whenever the risk of punishment is small enough to make violation the optimal decision (North, 1983 and Margolis, 1991 This is often referred to as the culture of death.
sector of the population, drug traffickers may have played a crucial role in the erosion of morals mentioned above.
The key argument here is that as crime became the way of life, many youngsters reduced the value they place on legitimacy, and hence beca me more predisposed toward crime. Wilson (1987 Wilson ( , 1996 has repeatedly made the some argument in his studies of inner-city youth in the United States. In Wilson's wo rds, "the more often certain behavior such as the pursuit of illegal income is manifested in a community, the greater will be the willingness on the part of some residents of the commun ity to find that behavior not only 
IV. Testing the Multiple Equilibria Model
What are the empirical predictions of the multiple equilib ria model concerning the distribution of crime rates across localities? Genera lly speaking, this model does not provide clear-cut predictions concerning the cross-sectio nal distribution of crime rates.
However, a stark prediction can be derived if we impose a few reasonable assumptions.
Indeed, if we assume first that "fundamentals" 13 do not differ significantly across localities and then that all localities are in steady state, the multiple equilibria model predicts a tight clustering of the data in that the between-cluster variance (as opposed to the withincluster variance) should account for the bulk of the variation of crime rates across localities. Figure 6 summarizes the argument in a schemat ic way.
Figure 6 seems to imply that there will always be some regions clustered around both the low-crime and the high-crime equilibrium. But t his does not have to be the case.
Formally, the equilibrium points refer to latent states that need not be "active." Indeed, nothing in the model precludes that a certain point in ti me all regions within a country are clustered around, say, the low-crime equilibrium. Now, if an exogenous shock -large enough to rattle the system-hits some regions today, we should expect to see the gradual emergence of a multi-modal distribution as the regions hi t by the shock flip from the lowcrime to the high-crime equilibrium. As shown below, th e Colombian data seems to be consistent with this pattern. More precisely, we obse rve that the Colombian regions widely regarded as the centers of cocaine trafficking seems to have gradually moved toward a high-crime equilibrium during the 1980s.
A sequence of estimated densities of the homicide rate a cross 25 Colombian states is shown in Figure 7 (see Appendix II for a description of the data). The homicide rate is defined here as homicides per 10,000 residents. I chose the homicide rate over alternative indices of violent crime because it is by far the mos t reliable uniform definition of violent crime. The choice of states over cities as the appropr iate geographic unit to test the crosssectional predictions of the multiple equilibria model is more controversial. Ideally, we should use the largest geographical unit for which the aver age crime participation rate in an "average" unit exerts a significant influence on the probability of arrest everywhere within the unit. There are at least two reasons to t hink that states are the right choice in this case. First, in Colombia many important budgetary decisions concerning law enforcement are made at the state level, so presumably a failure of state authorities to react to rising crime levels will lower the probabili ty of arrest everywhere in the state.
Second, the presence of substantial spatial autocorrelat ion of crime rates at the city level (see Figure 5 ) suggests that crime in adjacent cities may be driven by similar forces. If so, we should not treat cities as separate entities when t esting the multiple equilibria model.
Spatial autocorrelation, on the other hand, is complete ly absent at the state level data. Fundamentals include the availability of lawful opportunit ies, the profitability of crime, and social capital in a broad sense.
14 Using the Moran I statistic, I fail to reject the n ull hypothesis of the absence of spatial autocorrelatio n of crime rates across states for all periods analyzed.
The densities shown in Figure 7 were computed using a Gaussia n Kernel. The crucial step in non-parametric density estimation is th e choice of the bandwidth (Simonoff, 1996) . I used two different methods in this paper. The first method assumes that the underlying data comes from a Gaussian distribution whereas the second is completely nonparametric and only presupposes the existence of a smooth enough density (Sheather and Jones, 1991) . Both methods involve some sort of minimiza tion of the mean square error.
The latter methodology yielded what appears to be a great deal of spurious bumpiness, so I opted for the former. Neither the choice of the kern el nor the bandwidth estimation method affect the results in a qualitatively important w ay.
The emergence of a multi-modal distribution is evident fr om Figure 7 . The increase of homicides is clearly apparent as early as 1985, and the formation of clusters was completed by 1990. As noted above, this pattern is consiste nt with the hypothesis of a gradual movement of some Colombian states from a low-c rime to a high-crime equilibrium. Three modes are noticeable in the last two densities: the peak at 6 homicides per ten thousand residents (nearly identical to the hist orical value), a bulge at 12, and a bump at the staggering value of more than 20 homicides per te n thousand residents.
Alternatively, we can test the predictions of the mult iple equilibria model by computing the extent to which allowing the data to come from a mixture of distributions reduces the variance (Glaeser et al., 1995) . If allowing f or multiple equilibria results in a substantial reduction of the variance, this will provide additional evidence in favor of the model. Table 1 depicts the results of a test along these lines for the cross-state homicide rates in 1992. Mixtures involving two and three normal dist ributions were estimated using the EM principle developed by Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977) . All distributions were assumed to have the same variance but different means.
The results of Table 1 confirm the findings of the nonparametric density estimation. When a mixture of two normal distributions (two equilibria) was fitted to the data, the variance drops by 68 percent from 20.6 to 6.7. The da ta can then be split in two clusters: a low-crime one comprising 96 percent of the sa mple, and a high-crime comprising the remaining 4 percent (the latter "cluster" includes only one state, Antioquia, with roughly 13 percent of the country population Method: EM algorithm. Same variance in all distribu tions was assumed in the computations.
Benchmark computed using a lognormal distribution w ith identical first two moments to the actual data.
There is an important difference across states that w as not addressed above. We have not controlled here for the fact that the bulk of drug smuggling activities was concentrated in a few states. We can argue then that t he clustering in homicide rates uncovered above is just a reflection of the fact that drug smugglers murdered more people on those states where they routinely operated. Bluntly, we can argue that we need not appeal to a multiple equilibria story to explain the eviden ce. This alternative explanation, however, is not borne out by the available evidence.
As noted in Section II, more than 80 percent of all homicides in Colombia are unrelated to e ither drug trafficking or rebel activity. The same view has been repeatedly advanced in numerous studies and press reports dealing with the origins of violence in Colombi a.
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In sum, fundamentals alone (including the relative prevalence of drug-smuggling and rebel activities) can not explain the regional disparities of violent criminal studied abov e.
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In the period under analysis, governors in Colombia wer e appointed rather than elected. Arguably, the number of appointments within a period of time provides a good proxy of political instability in the state.
16
A recent document released by the Colombian presidency asserts that "when the criminal problem is carefully looked at, one finds that most homicides in Co lombia (nearly 80 percent) are caused by ordinary violent acts not directly related to criminal organiza tions." (quoted by Gaitan, 1995, pp. 316) . Likewise, El Tiempo -Colombian leading newspaper-asserted recently that "the homicides caused by the stateguerrilla confrontation and by the so-called massacres are dwarfed by the homicides caused by the diffused and generalized violence of the streets." (El Ti empo, May 4, 1998).
There is an important subtlety in the previous discussion that is worth spelling out. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 EJS: Efficiency of the judiciary system as computed by Mauro (1995) .
PS: Political stability as computed by Mauro (1995) .
Resid: Residual after regressing HOM on all the oth er variables.
